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The Triumph and Sorrow of Beauty:
Comparing the Recursive, Contrapuntal,
and Cellular Aesthetics of Being

GEORGE MENTORE
University of Virginia
gm3c@virginia.edu

INTRODUCTION
This is an anthropological essay about alternative forms of social being.  
It is written in tribute to the teachings of Joanna Overing.  In this regard
let me begin by making it patently obvious that such teachings have never
failed to differentiate between textual representations and real people and
that (as it has so clearly been reconfirmed by Tim Ingold in his most recent
2007 Radcliff-Brown Lecture) no one should confuse an anthropological
essay for ethnographic description, as anthropology and ethnography do
not amount to the same thing.      
Overworked and often made to expire and become weakly what
they represent, textual words remain practically all we possess in way
of legitimately expressing the anthropological knowledge learned from
cloistered academy and accomplished fieldwork.   Yet regardless of how
strongly and anxiously our literate community wishes textual words to be
the world experienced, the latter can never actually be the sum of observed
and felt human knowledge.  The human imagination and its unlimited
capacity for intellectual stimulus easily outstrip text.  Left with the cultural
legacy of textual words, however, the conscientious anthropologists must
struggle with this limit in the project of translating different representations
of the human experience.  Therefore, this essay celebrates, in the spirit of
her particular concern for the integrity of such anthropological ventures,
the consistent Overing credo that any comparative knowledge about the
world always proclaims its life in the world with some form of moral bias
(Overing 1985; Overing and Passes 1999).  Having firmly inculcated these
concerns I here turn cautiously to a critical anthropological analysis of
Amerindian, Antillean, and North American knowledge forms of social
being.
1
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I compare three cultural aesthetics of social being: (1) the recursive of
Waiwai, (2) the contrapuntal of coastal Guyanese, and (3) the cellular of
United States expatriates in Guyana.  I argue that because Waiwai society
privileges lateral visibility it tends to bring ideas about the fractal individual
into association with recursive appeals of presence.   Alternatively, for
coastal Guyanese and United States societies respectively, they privilege
axial visibility that brings their concepts about autonomous individualism
into association with contrapuntal and cellular aesthetics of being.  
My Foucaudian emphasis upon visibilty arises from an understanding
of modern societies as deeply “disciplinarian” and concerned with
exercising a power that traverses every possible apparatus or institution
as the surveillance knowledge of individual bodies.  Because it effeciently
induces “a state of conscious and permanent visibility,” one that “assures
the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault 1978:201), the panopticon
serves as the principal operator for this modern power/knowledge relation.  
In the circle around the central tower, its arrangement of individual cells
“imposes … an axial visibility” (1978:201).   Thus, while its imposition
of axial visibility stresses docility and surveillance, its arrangement also
exhibits an aesthetic of the cellular.  I contend, therefore, that in ideal forms
of modern power, the social relations in Western individuals function like
the panoptic effect—separating “cells” of identities and dividing selves from
others.  In this regard, lateral visibility would be the absence or demise of
divided cells, the side walls of which having never been built or having
been destroyed to allow communion between individual inmates.  Lateral
visibility displays then the equivalent of what occurs in many nonmodern
societies, that is, the impossibility of “a collection of separated individuals”
(1978:201).   Also, with lateral visibility, a contrapuntal aesthetic can be
obtained; its sonic admixtures invading and challenging the visual, helping
to give form to different kinds of social being.
After opening with the theme of sorrow, I proceed to present the Waiwai
triumph of beauty, where weaving, kinship, and counting reiterate the core
principle to sequential movement in the assemblage of social personhood.  
For Waiwai society, the assembled aggregate and the fractal entities of the
individual always integrally imply each other.  In the example of coastal
Guyanese society, where the contrapuntal authority of the voice makes its
appeal to gathered audiences, this tends to bring forth the lateral visibility
of the speaker.  By contrast, the textual projects of the state seek out and
place emphasis upon axial visibility, specifically for the establishment of
greater control and obedience of its citizens.  The former uses mimesis
and looks for honor in the voice while the latter demands discipline and
respect by way of the text.  I conclude with the Jonestown Templars in the
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forest of Guyana, the making of Western loneliness, and the modern desire
for fellowship.  And, in doing so, I ask what do cellular aesthetic and axial
visibility mean for an understanding of United States mass killings.
The heuristic device applied to affect this analysis derives from
anthropological considerations that work to identify the cultural spaces
that express social relations.  I hold that the propensity of such spaces for
negotiating human relations stems from their ability to be the visible forms
of knowing how to experience and confirm the social life of the self with
others.  I, therefore, single out lateral and axial visibility as the means for
identifying these cultural spaces.1 Because social relations always appear
robust with ideas about an aesthetic of being, lateral and axial visibility
serve thus as my general device for providing a comparative analysis of
power and pleasure.
THE SORROW OF BEAUTY
He inhaled his breath.  He held it deep inside his stomach.  A feeling
of panic cascaded over and down his body.  It was deliberate.  He wanted
to impress in his speech as well as in his posture the feeling of an impeding
collapse.   How better to bring to his talk the mood of a misgiving?  
Towatowa struggled to tell with old words this new tale about strange
events on the other side of the forest:
“The Sunfish People are killing themselves.” He explained with an exhale of
breath.
“They are killing themselves and their babies.”
“Many of them, many, many, of them.”
“The vultures have darkened the sky”
“They will soon be drunk on the meat of rotten flesh.”
“The earth will be writhing with worms.”
“Imminently the beauty of their village will have disappeared and the ugliness
of the bad shall trumpet its victory.”

As Towatowa continued, the crowd contemplated in bewilderment
the words and images they were receiving.  For many days afterward, the
Waiwai of Shepariymo village remained curious and intrigued.  They had
never before thought such kind of dying could manifest in the world.  
As the messages about the rising death toll of the Peoples Temple cult
members at Jonestown circulated among the villagers, I took particular
note of how the Waiwai interpreted and where in their intellectual scheme
they placed the knowledge of these events.  What I gathered was that the

3
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dark shamanic forces at work must have been influencing or enticing away
the ekatï (spiritual vitalities) of each and every Templar.  To be able to force
out of each living body these vitalities that sustained life, and being able
to deny the return of such vitalities to their human host, could only be the
work of dark shamanic intent.  How could a community of so many people
be so terribly unconstrained by good will that it would allow the purpose
of immorality to destroy it in this way?  This, I believe, was the lingering
question behind the look of perplexity on each face.  To amass this amount
of ill will against so many people at the same time and in the same place
appeared to the Waiwai to be the most shocking thing they could imagine,
and indeed, the very sorrow over the defeat of beauty.   For them, there
could be only one way to live, that is, in the splendor of kinship morality,
whose main purpose is to keep such violence at bay.
THE TRIUMPH OF BEAUTY
The Waiwai, it can be ascertained, idealize social relations as if
they manifest a woven pattern, one that reveals itself as individual reeds
alternating under and over each other like known human responsibilities.  
The pattern entails woyesï: the replicating of an action in a sequence
towards an assemblage, in other words, a woven pattern assimilates into
itself each of its preceding plaits.  When functioning as the overall effect
of a tight plait of relationships, these “reeds of responsibility,” constitute
the full and substantive life of an individual as social person.  At one and
the same time and in the same space of the individual body, the reeds
of responsibility assemble as the very aggregate of society, as well as the
veracity of an individual’s subjectivities.
Here in the conceptual anthropological understanding of Waiwai
society—as they would manifest it as ewto and be interpreted by
anthropology as “village”—no distinction should be drawn between
society and individual.  The Waiwai word for human individual is toto.  
In ewtoto: meaning both “the place where people live and the people who
live in this place,” the two words are spliced together to form one.  Note
that this is the exact anthropological conclusion suggested for the “Fractal
Person,” in that this “is never a unit standing in relation to an aggregate,
or an aggregate standing in relation to a unit, but always an entity with
relationship integrally implied” (Wagner 1991:163).
In the Waiwai model of the complete person, čewyarono, the vitality
of spiritual substance (ekatï) must first inhabit and give life to the body.  
In providing heat, movement, emotion, thought, and consciousness to
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the individual, spiritual vitality becomes dispersed and housed at various
locations within and throughout the body.  The spiritual vitality of the
eyes (ewrïkatï) can be observed when the tiny image of oneself can be
seen reflected in the eyes of another.  The spiritual vitality of the chest
(ewankatï) locates itself in the cavernous seat of the solar plexus.   Even
the very heat of the living body provides proof of the spiritual substances
necessary for maintaining an active life.   And yet, in addition to these
differential subjectivities (made possible by Waiwai understandings of the
body as having differential regions or parts offering location or “place”
for such subjectivities), the social substantiveness of the body must be
presented and brought into motion for čewyarono to be fully in the world
as a proper comment about the world (see Rosengren, Santos-Granero and
Werlang, intra, for discussion of similar notions among other Amerindian
peoples).
The reciprocal relations of responsibility to others considered o-yepamrï
or o-poyin (my-kindred) epitomize the social identity of a čewyarono.  So
complete in yepamrï relations is such a person, he or she understands him
or herself to be independent from outside need or assistance, for all can
be gained and achieved within the kind of wholeness implicit to being
čewyarono.  To subtract from or to add infinitely to such wholeness cannot,
however, proportionally alter a čewyarono.  Just like the individual reeds of
a basket being woven, the fractality of the čewyarono personhood always
assembles sequentially toward or away from a supplement or assimilation of
wholeness.  At the very moment or in the very ambience of being possibly
without kindred (possibly subtracted to zero or indeed to an absence of
being), or having too many kindred (possibly adding infinitum to becoming
a supreme being), čewyarono substantively and recursively accounts
proportional kindred.  For example, in Waiwai society even an unknown
guest/visitor (pawana) within the midst of the community immediately
becomes and, indeed, has always been conceptually both wošin (affine) and
epeka (consanguine).  All those who instantly refer to the visitor as wošin—
as is the custom—will have those living in the community who call them
wošin, calling the visitor their epeka.  Anecdotally, in this understanding of
society, the first question to ask a visitor is not “where is your passport?” but
“where are your kindred?”
The movement of fractality and wholeness operative in čewyarono has
perhaps its most obvious corollary in the Waiwai counting system of šimšim or ukoknon macho.   Šim-šim actually refers more deliberately to the
knotted string used for counting down the days to ceremonial events.  The
concept of a recurring unit of one can be inferred from the onomatopoeic
repeating of the word šim and from each knot tied or untied on the string.  

5
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Both inferences implicate the sun and its movement through the sky
“tying-up” or completing a day (see Passes, intra, for similar importance of
metaphor in Pa’ikwené mathematics).  Take particular note, the word for
hand, kamorï, builds on the word for sun, kamo.  It is, however, in ukoknon
macho that the idea of recursive counting best suggests itself.  In historically
adjusting to the previously unknown object of the camera (but certainly
not to its already known capability) the Waiwai call cameras ukoknon kacho.  
Interestingly enough they call the relatively recently introduced Western
calendar nuni ukoknon and map rowo ukoknon. Here the inference seems to
be, like counting, that the camera, calendar, and map repeat holistically the
objects of which they take account.  In other words, they each do the work
of assemblage: they assemble, respectively, the image of the subject/object
in the photograph, the reappearance of the moon, and the surface of the
earth.  This assembling requires the sequential movement of wholeness
to provide, in its action, a fractality recurving into wholeness once again.  
Thus the very principle of recursiveness can be apprehended in the Waiwai
words for counting.
They do indeed have a recursive counting system that offers four
basic numbers: čewñe (one), asakï (two), osorowau (three), and thathoyere
(four).  It is, however, a system where the counted digits assimilate to the
final number reached.   Hence, adding another digit to thathoyere would
provide čewñe-kamorï (five, or literally “one-hand”).   Continuing in the
same way the sequence repeats itself but as čewñe-šahara-kamorï (six, or
“one-and-a-hand”), asakï-šahara-kamorï (seven, or “two-and-a-hand”),
osorowau-šahara-kamorï (eight, or “three-and-a-hand”), thathoyere-šaharakamorï (nine, or “four-and-a-hand”), and hanoro-kamorï (ten, or literally
“another-hand).  Sometimes instead of hanoro-kamorï, they will say asathokamorï, which literally translates as “a pair of hands” or “the hand twinned.”  
Although iračon-hïrame-kïtarï can be translated literally as “a-foot-splitaway-from-its-pair,” it carries the principal meaning of “two hands and a
foot,” in other words, the assemblage of fifteen.  Hanoro-kïtarï, although
translated as “another foot” actually means the assemblage of twenty.  This
sequence of counting fingers and toes, hands and feet that makes evident
the Waiwai recursive numerical system, also reveals, in the constant
completing of the whole, a single human individual: a toto.
The assembled aggregate of the individual always integrally implies its
fractal entities and the fractal entities their aggregated assemblage.  The
scale or proportion remains the same; regardless of where, who, or when,
the conceptual human scale of the individual does not alter.   Even the
perfectibility of the čewyarono manifests as an instance in a very human
proportionality.  Any increment in social status has to keep its scale; it is
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proportionally exact and holistic in its multidimensionality.  Any instance
of such grandeur recurves to what preceded it in order to retain its human
scale: any increase in social status does not then alter the proportions of
the individual, or of society.  In spiritual vitality and in social being, the
fractal and total sum of the individual, as a person, retains the defining
characteristics of a very human scale, even in their magnitude.
The Waiwai apply the same aesthetic criteria for all things beautiful as
they do to the making of proper social beings.  The assemblage points for
material culture, humanity, and sociality are for them deliberately recursive
in character and implicate, I would argue, the same conceptual schema of
a continuity between fractality and an aggregated totality.
Consider the category of o-yepamrï, my-kindred, as the contributing
scale for the proper assemblage of the complete person, čewyarono; it always
exemplifies the fact of erowaray—the similarity of appearance between
things.   In the case of kindred, it exemplifies the obvious resemblance
between individuals from the same womb and, by implication, the same
village.   It is, however, woyesï, as the activated sequential assembling
of kindred, which actually allows the resemblances to be observable
and, indeed, be the instance for commentary about the reeds of social
responsibility.   Čenporin, beauty, can be appreciated as this assemblage of
kindred.  It is the totality or oneness produced by the recursiveness of the
assembling that holds the aesthetic.  The resemblances between kindred
suggest a balance: a kind of harmony pleasing to Waiwai sensibility.  The
same effect can be produced at assemblage points other than that of
kindred, for example, at baskets, canoes, and houses, even at the vaulted
sphere of the universe.  And yet, the production of such pleasure in the
beauty of the complete, of oneness, necessitates the generative impulse of
difference.  In other words, kindred resemblances already imply an integral
fractality.
To return now to čewyarono as an example of a magnified social status
that, nevertheless, retains its human scale and unaltered proportions: I
think we can establish the fact that kindred—which defines the magnitude
of čewyarono—assembles as the fractality of completeness.  When properly
deployed as the reeds of responsibility, such kindred aggregation offers the
čew prefix in čew-ne (one) to the čew prefix in čew-yarono: yarono being
the agreement, “yaro,” or truth of the matter, in this case, the obvious
expansive beauty of the totality assembled through kindred in čewyarono.  
The sequence follows the same pattern throughout.   For example, in
the particular instance of a čewyarono having kindred in the category of
karipamšam—the designation for young unmarried men—the kari prefix
derives directly from the word kari-tu, meaning to be or to feel strong.  The
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word stem of pam has its equivalent in the stem for the word ye-pam-rï,
kindred.  It is as if the assembling for the concept of kindred recurves from
the fractality of young men’s strength.  And yet this strength of youthful
masculinity has its source, nonetheless, in the pre-existing categories of
adulthood.
The social enlargement of young men and women into adulthood retains a relative scale.  Karipamšam and emasï (young unmarried women)
complement each other and thus provide each other with the relational
potential for becoming porintomo (adult man) and anačwan (adult woman)
respectively.  Marriage and parenthood transform karipamšam and emasï
into porintomo and anačwan.  The strength of the young man that derives
from his parents recursively constitutes the very supplement necessary to
formulate the personhood of the new adult man.  The same can be said for
the young woman and her social enlargement into an adult woman.  The
reeds of responsibility integrally implied in each individual bring other
individuals into form as proportionally complete persons.  In the Waiwai
kinship system, category terms in the second generation above and below ego designate all as kindred.  Because of the preceding wholeness of
porintomo and anačwan, senior people in the gendered forms of pocha (old
man) and chacha (old woman) become at the same time grandfather and
grandmother respective to everyone in ego’s generation.   Similarly, but
without the difference of gender, all in the second generation below ego
become o-parï (grandchild) to those in ego’s generation.  But I think it is
with the particular category of ewto mïtwim or ewto yusom (literally “village
leader”) we can see best the consistency of the conceptual model for the
Waiwai recursive system of being and its tendency to produce a triumph
of beauty even when a proportional increase in status or power appears.
Today the Waiwai use the word kayaritomo for village leader far more
frequently than they do either ewto mïtwim or ewto yusom.  I have it on
good authority that the missionaries introduced this word during the
1950s when they were carrying out evangelizing work and translating the
Bible into Waiwai.  It appears they compounded the word karitu (“strong”)
and imo (stem for “big”) to capture their understanding of the overarching,
singular power of political leadership.   Given their particular North
American perspective on the individual and political systems, the intent
of the Texan missionaries must have been to interpret Waiwai leadership
in terms of an accumulated and possessed axial power at the center.  
What must have appeared to them as Waiwai “chiefs”—big men whose
enlargement of social status seemed to provide the authority to command
and be obeyed—allowed for the missionary usurping of the old word with
the new.  How difficult must it have been for them not to see the lateral
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pull of the Waiwai reeds of responsibility?
Even though kayaritomo has successfully replaced the older terms
for village leader, the character of leadership itself remains very much
in the style of its traditional meaning.  Waiwai leaders pull in the lateral
concentric forces of society by allowing themselves to be subject to the
tasks they undertake and in which they wish others would participate.  
Obedience derives not from any direct command, punishment, or potential
of punishment made by individual or group, but rather from knowing an
integral relationship already exists between self and other that delimits
distinction between the two.  When one convinces oneself to do a particular
thing it implies that others—already part of one’s fractal identity—will do
so also as an integral repercussion of oneself.  Therefore any accumulation
of and increase in prestige, privilege, or authority from accomplishments
by an individual amounts to a similar magnitude of empowerment to
others.   In other words, the exercise of power carries its own impact of
subordination into the one who exercises it as well as into those upon
whom it is exercised.  While from one narrow vantage point hierarchy can
clearly be observed in the rising elevation of each circle within the circle,
when known and experienced as fractal, concentric lateral power reduces
and nullifies the overall impression of rank.   Here the recursive system
of power produces a political aesthetic never reducing the individual to a
single entity vulnerable to the negative effects of domination.
The comfort and solace achieved from being a fractal person among
the Waiwai is the triumph of beauty.   Individual autonomy cannot be
contemplated.  If it could, it would be as a distant shapeless form on the
horizon of experience: sad and ugly.   Indeed, an autonomy leading to
solitude would be the obvious outcome of such a being, but in Waiwai
theory, one totally out of the question.   In their modes of knowledge,
autonomy and solitude cannot even be posed as a possibility, much less as
a query.  
Rather than imposing theories about being and time on the Waiwai,
perhaps it is better to consider accepting the obvious—that their assumptions
and means of knowing exist in different historical and cultural frameworks.  
In their system of knowledge, seeking to be a complete person who in the
process of perfectibility of an autonomous individuality has no grounds for
desire.  Here, in their knowledge system, seeking to objectify the singularity
of an individual life, as an experience in chronological time, cannot begin
to take affect.   For this reason, disciplinary time cannot be used as a
coercive technique upon the body.  Measuring, protracting, documenting,
and competing against time, so as to claim an achieved victory over life or
to bring life under greater scrutiny and control, does not appear to have
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relevance for the Waiwai.  The beauty of a full life exists and cannot be
denied to any individual who comes into the preexisting social world.  
Since assembled kindred exist in society, you therefore already exist.  The
Waiwai recursive system of being a social person distributes the splendor
of life, not as moments retrieved from an absence, but as a simultaneous
acknowledgement of preexisting presence.
CONTRAPUNTAL AUTHORITY
“Shatter,” “Reload,” and “Bin Laden” appear as words on privately
owned vehicles.   Today they name treasured properties and proclaim
their owners’ power to possess and to do so in an aggressive masculine
style.  Virulent, vibrant texts reach out to snatch your attention as they
speed by on the fronts and sides of taxies, minibuses, and donkey carts,
all plying their trade in the busy streets of Georgetown, the capital city
of Guyana.  This is the coastal urban landscape of the soldiers who were
stationed at Kanashen when the Waiwai were receiving the news about
the deaths of the Templars.  Here orality and textuality have had a long
and contentious relationship: the voice and the written word have been
embattled old warriors in the theatre of human conflict from the moment
colonialism stepped off the deck in the New World.   Beguiled into the
ramparts of the voice, European text still continues in Guyana today to be
mesmerized by the power of contrapuntal speech styles from Africa, India,
and China.  Here, in the delirium of its own conceit, text often presents
itself confidently as the master rather than as the slave of the voice.
The concept of the individual in this social setting, I would argue,
can be approached through an understanding of the contrapuntal
authority of the voice.  (Because of the historical, linguistic, regional, and
theoretical confusion around the use of the term “Creole,” I here make
the word “contrapuntal” do the work of conveying the idea of “mixture”
which the former does in current scholarship on the Antilles.   Also, in
tribute to a little known but provocative article by Karl Riesman called
“Contrapuntal Conversations,” I consider what he evokes for speech in
Antigua to be a useful analytical device for interpreting Guyanese as well
as Antillean identity in general.)   Where the appeal to an immediate
human audience provides the most meaningful and corroborative sense of
individual empowerment, speech—rather than writing—overwhelms the
social scene.  Lateral visibility to a gathered audience provides the primary
sense of presence that fulfills and comforts the individual.  Even when this
audience can be considered imaginary, for example, when individuals talk
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to what may appear to be themselves, an appeal to gathered spectators
brings forth the speaker and assumes an interlocutor for the voice.  This is
not madness.  It is rather a question of an asserted presence in a continuous
cultural campaign to redeem individual human respect.  
To apply this kind of performance theory to Guyanese society requires
taking seriously the sense of an individual honor, first made desirable, then
permanently kept out of reach by perceived mysteries to esteem, whose
origins now appear lost in a history of slavery, emancipation, indentured
servitude, and European metropolitan greed (Wilson 1973; Rodney
1981; Patterson 1982; Abrahams 1983).  This processing of the concept
of lateral visibility, through the means of contrapuntal speech, fondly
embraces the so-called negative and dividing ideals about “impurity” and
“fragmentation” instituted in societies influenced by Antillean culture
and history.  Perhaps disconcerting to us, but quite the norm for coastal
Guyanese society, contrapuntal authority acclaims the positive attributes
of mixture and ambiguity.  In so doing, it not only disperses away from
the vulnerable self the cultural awareness of shame, but also retrieves for
the individual a pride and dignity in the very appropriation and display
of the impure and fragmented.   Despite its overwhelming desire to be
overcome by the axial visibility of European rationalist ideals, even the
Guyanese state has had to deal with the realities of its own prevalence as
a distinct contrapuntal polity.  Arguably unknown, perhaps even to itself,
the distinctive contrapuntal attributes of its statehood percolate up from a
citizenry whose expressive lives depend upon an assertive presentment of a
gregarious individualism.
Bright, loud, pungent, hot, and spicy are attributes of coastal Guyanese
society that intermingle with the subdued, moderate, clear, cool, and mild
to form an aesthetic of being that is lived rather than reflected upon.  Set
on a dramatic stage of contradictions, the consciousness of being “Third
World,”—that is, of having yet to “become” modern and “First World”
and the actual lived reality of being this at the moment it is experienced
as such—not only gets explained as an inferior form of existence but also
as being no form of existence at all.  It is as if coastal Guyanese society
deliberately props up in front of its view, at its axial center, the Western
rationalist tower of modernity only to counterpoint it with lateral relations
in a contrapuntal display of an alternative authority system.  Together the
center and the circumference cancel each other out in the performance
of everyday life.  The security, which the lateral circumference provides
against the center, requires the interplay of both the suppression of the
latter and the triumph of the former while realizing such triumph as no
triumph at all.2
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The axial effort to contrive inferiority not only for lateral relations
but also for any alternative Antillean identity hinges upon denying the
interpretative worthiness of mimesis.   The mimetic clearly augments
performance.   It permits, for example, the familiar to be recognized in
unfamiliar scenes.  It also, however uncritically, permits the copied to avoid
the accusation of being fabricated: the copy serves to give to the original
its originality.  This latter point has worked in favor of the transmission
of colonial power (where it is often argued, self-evident truth, rather
than political coercion, has produced the experience and knowledge of
colonized being).  The structure of mimesis has allowed colonial powers—
that consider the mimetic to be an invalid form of being—to make the
confident and safe claim, for example, that the copy has no credence of
its own.  When the colonial gaze sees the copy, rather than being seen as
the repeat of the authentic, real, true, or even as natural progress linked to
inevitable forces of development, it is viewed instead as serving to identify
the childlike, innocent, and feeble.  On the other hand, what appears to
the doubters of authenticity to be the mistaken product of the mimetic,
colonial powers interpret as the obvious rational approach to knowledge
and being.  For example, instead of colonial powers saying and believing
the colonized put on shirts and ties, listen to classical music, learn to be
literate, and adopt bipartite parliamentary systems because they copy
us, such powers say the colonized do so because it is simply the rational,
appropriate thing to do.  
Western and Western-influenced powers prefer this explanation
because it deflects attention away from the fact that their so-called
“original” is itself fabricated.   Western and Western-influenced ideas of
the individual identify, participate, and produce, yet also blatantly deny, the
part they play in the inventing and placing of selfhood in the original.  To
these ideas and those individuals identified by them comes the confident
sense of legitimate empowerment and benefits.  They come directly from
within societies established and determined by Western knowledge and
truth.  The character of a certain kind of rationalist order pervades.  The
character of an ironic kind of docility also becomes evident in the making
and sustaining of a rationalist order.   While the policing of pain and
humiliation ranks high as an effort to achieve a greater sense of moral
worth, it falls short and below the concern to monitor the efforts needed
to establish greater control and obedience.
Let me briefly provide an example from Guyanese statehood: a case
of the mimetic, the influence from colonialism, and the persistence of
modern Western values producing instances and sites of axial visibility.  
Printed in black and red lettering on white signs outside the gates of many
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government ministries in Georgetown is the command:
Ladies:  No slippers, short pants, tights, fine strap or strapless dress or top,
midriff or tubes, T-shirt with indecent language or art.  Gents: No slippers,
short pants, 3/4 pants, trunks, sleeveless jerseys, vests, T-shirt with indecent
language or art.  Dress appropriately—save yourself from any embarrassment.  
By order of the Management.

I do not have the space or the agenda to expound in-depth upon the
relevant meanings presumed to be operative within Guyanese concepts
about bodily adornment.  It should be taken for granted, however, that a
particular cultural logic does function to structure the dress code the state
seeks to manage.  I am less interested here in the logic of axial power to
organize concepts of bodily adornment and more in the significant concern
by the state for its power to command and to be obeyed vis-à-vis things
like bodily adornment.
I once literally had to give my shirt to a man who had traveled fifty
miles to the city from a rural coastal community to have his painful tooth
extracted by a state administered dental clinic.  The uniformed guard at
the gate of the clinic had refused to let him enter because his shirt was
torn.  Examples of this kind of anxiety by the state about the lack of respect
for its power are legion.  They are made more incomprehensible by the
fact that many of its agents know very well the kinds of hardship involved
in traveling to the city from rural communities and the indignity felt by
those who have to stoop to receive help from the state.  To the prospect
that the desired yet unrequited modern “cellular” (or panoptic induced)
existence of its citizenry could be undermined by support from lateral
sources, the state and its vulnerability at the center place the former in
the position of behaving in Draconian ways.  The Guyanese who operate
under the influence of coastal culture do have and actively do instigate
the mechanisms of a principle and the aesthetics of a being which find
comfort in the lateral as opposed to the axial visible strategies of being.  
But, this alternative threatens the authority of the state and undermines its
confidence to give commands and receive obedience from its citizens.
In the middle of the most choked intersection and on the busiest of
shopping days in the city, I witnessed, along with many others, a fight
between two men.  They were stripped down to the waist.  Each held up
their hands folded into fists.  They were poised like two pugilists from
an Arcadian print.  Traffic from all four directions had stopped and was
backed up for at least four blocks.  Crowds of pedestrians milled around
the two protagonists, preventing the minibuses, cars, motorbikes, and
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horse-drawn vehicles from moving.  The pugilists swung at each other
and the crowd roared.  The crowd was jubilant.  The pugilists were serious.  
The uniformed policemen, normally stationed here to direct traffic, hid
amongst the crowd.  No one seemed to think the fight between the two
men needed to be stopped.  Indeed, the general opinion appeared to be
that one of them had insulted the other and the need to reclaim or defend
honor had pulled both into the fight.  No one present seemed perturbed
that the main stream of traffic in the capital city had been brought to a
standstill by two men on the busiest day in the week.
In coastal Guyanese society, through diverse informal codes of public
conduct, each individual intuitively comes to know and believe that they
have immediate access to a moral justice located in an audience.  The right
to appeal derives from a learnt sense of self-worth confirmed in the evident
expressive ownership of the voice.  It appears that the same demand from
the state for respect also exists in its citizens.  What the state seeks in text
the citizen seeks in the voice.  Both operate in Guyanese culture to offset
or keep at bay what they call “eye-pass.”  
Eye-pass, or what is called in other parts of the Antilles as “cut-eye,”
has been defined as “a deliberate, aggressive attempt to curtail or reduce
someone else’s being” (Sanders 1987:135).   In common usage, “to take
your eyes and pass someone” is “to humiliate or belittle another by claiming some form of moral superiority” (1987:135).  To express disrespect
deliberately—to shame someone publicly in order to claim higher moral
standing over them—is considered an act of supreme injustice.  Because it
targets the inadequacies of the individual being humiliated as an oblique
technique for drawing attention to the esteem of the individual performing the shaming, eye-pass is always considered iniquitous.   Quite apart
from the eye-passer making claims to an honor he or she does not deserve,
it is unjust if not out right wicked to build one’s esteem on the demise of
another.  By thinking so little of someone, you would not be deterred by
their ability to defend themselves from shaming, denies that someone their
just desserts.   Every individual possesses the irreducible moral worth of
an honor that can and should be defended.  To disrespect such honor, “to
take your eyes and pass” such honor by deliberately attacking it inflicts an
emotional hurt upon the individual (and, I might even add, upon the community itself ).  It is an unjust form of violence because it operates under
the false assumption of a moral weakness on the part of the victim (and
perhaps even on the part of the victim’s community).
When the contrapuntal Guyanese asserts individual self will and,
in counterpoint, helps orchestrate an aesthetic of sociality with others,
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they permit perceived natural justice to manifest its absolute presence.  
Incorporating rather than vanquishing the oppositional contribution of
others provides an inherent morality to enter society and to display its
existence.  Even in the political theatre of known unequal relations between
the state and citizen, the character of the entrance and performance of this
morality cannot be but suggestive of a relative horizontal equity.  It does
so because its features absolutely depend upon the asserted contribution
of others.  The contrapuntal Guyanese person always aggressively seeks
to implicate others, to draw them into counterpoint and, in so doing, to
give lyrical meaning to moral existence.  Each contributing subject adds to
the volume and orchestrated shape of moral existence.  In coastal society,
contrapuntal authority flays naked the lie embedded in modern political
claims about democracy and the “rule of law.”  As it exposes the fact of
equality unachieved, it also immediately introduces and provides the
needed sanctuary of equity.  In empirically embodied ways, the processes
of contrapuntal authority deliver the confirmed truths of an available and
accessed equity to each individual subject.
Clock towers and traffic lights—built and put in place during British
rule to instill a measured order and obedience among the colonized—
stand as broken monuments of a contradictory hegemony.  Today not a
single clock tower chimes or tocks its regime of punctuality over coastal
Guyana.   In these edifices, Greenwich Mean Time can no longer copy
and relay its command from the tiny hill in London to the wide shores
of South America.   Even as consumer capitalism and the developed
sense of autonomous individualism cultivated markets for the purchase
of personal “time-pieces” (watches), the latter became stage props in the
play of status rather than instruments of docility for the contrapuntal
Guyanese.  Similarly, Georgetown streets have traffic lights other than as
a reminder of the nation’s failure to be modern or indeed of the nation’s
success in defeating the regime of colonial ideology.   The assertive
individual subjectivities of its road users carefully negotiate busy traffic
intersections avoiding the kind of harm presumed to result from the lack
of an effaced authority.  Found not only in these particular cultural sites but
also throughout coastal Guyanese society, the counterpoint of lateral and
axial visibility represents the contrapuntal authority of a very distinctive
response to being in the modern world.   It is the kind of response the
soldiers stationed at Kanashen carried with them into the southern forest.
At the time of the Jonestown killings, the soldiers made their memory
and lived experience of contrapuntal identity resonate around the forest.  
They purposely evacuated the solitude and tedium of daily life in the
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forest with the sweet din of their voices.  The noise they made every day
could be heard for miles around rebounding off the wall of trees and
ricocheting back to them within the compound.   Each soldier found
refuge from their loneliness by inflicting an intrusive presence into their
surroundings.   With such action, each pulled their comrades into the
shared world of being impinged upon and having similarly to retaliate.  
These young men knew already how to arm themselves against the civic
experience of modern solitude and in the forest they intuitively brought
such tactics into effect.  They carried with them from coastal society the
learnt knowledge of contrapuntal authority.   When news of Jonestown
came to them over the radiophone from army units closer to the scene,
their incredulity was, like those of other coastal Guyanese, thick upon their
faces and throughout their various attempts to explain the event.   Like
the Waiwai, they could not quite fathom the impulses of the Templars to
take their lives and those of their kindred in such circumstances.  Like the
Waiwai, the soldiers already possessed and had serving them a viable social
means of eradicating individual loneliness, but it was one which proved
inadequate for interpreting the actions of the Templars from the Templars’
point of view.
CELLULAR AESTHETICS
I do not want to delve extensively into the events of Jonestown.  A
good deal has already been written about the deaths of 922 United States
citizens in the Northwest region of Guyana on November 18, 1978
(see Lewis 1979; Mills 1979; Weightman 1983; Hall 1987; Chidester
1988; Maaga 1998).   My main interests here rest with the strictures of
knowledge which informed the actions occurring on that faithful day.  I
seek an anthropology of the event made to reveal something of the quality
of relations existing between society and its members, particularly when
placed in a setting of comparative analysis.  Thus when positioned to view
United States national society not from a perspective of economic fetishism
or religious delirium but rather from what I am calling the aesthetics of
cellular being, the killings at Jonestown do not appear extraordinary, but
rather as a predictable outcome to life in perhaps the most advanced of
industrialized societies.
I am not going to bare down upon the capitalist alienation theories
often cited as the cause for the heightened development of modern
individualism (Williams 1964; Lewis 1979; Rodney 1988).   I believe
them to be suspect in often implying a socialist alternative and thus do
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not critically crack open the problem of centralized state power.  I do not
consider the political archrival of capitalism to be communism.  Rather,
they are copartners strategically set in opposition to each other to divert
attention away from the fact that both historically come out of the same
modern imaginings and social formations.    Perhaps no better place to
witness this assertion than in the compromise of religious and political
ideology of the Peoples Temple church, where apostolic socialism was the
guiding theology of its faithful.
I am also not going to be tempted by pseudo or genuine sociopsychological theories like “brainwashing” and “cognitive dissonance”
to explain the increased sense of longing and loneliness often said to be
indicative of modern Western life (Festinger 1957; Brehm and Cohen 1962;
Aronson 1969; Hassan 1990; Singer 1995).  For me, such theories seem to
prevail because, within the cultural paradigms producing them, the space
for identity and motivation is already occupied by a strong sense of the
independent ego.  In this space the brain and its cognition are considered
principal players in human action.   Hence weak brains and childlike
cognitive response (rather than the realities of social existence) provide
explanations for the drastic results of those lonely people influenced by
the ravings of charismatic cult leaders, heavy-metal pop singers, and the
devil himself.  Instead, however, I am going to presume any such cultural
knowledge about selfhood, assembled in society, reveals a great deal about
the meanings and forms of its members’ actions.
It would be quite easy to trace the anxiety the modern state betrays
about its legitimate right to use violence to its strongly held views about
selfhood.  We can witness, for instance, the imprint of state concern about
its own power to kill through some of its evocative twentieth century
rituals, beliefs, and ecstatic expressions such as the deployment of armies
into international warfare, the government-sanctioned racial “cleansings”
of the Holocaust, and capital punishment.  The nervousness stems in part
from the tremendous responsibilities it has taken unto itself for being the
only legitimate user of violence.  As with economic systems and labor, so
too with human polities and violence: society appears to recognize, in its
various ways, that each and every one of its members has the potential to
use physical force.  One could argue administrating such force for economic
production and for political power tends to be the fundamental interest of
all societies.  As part of our social contract with the state and as a statement
about our vulnerable isolation, we modern citizens have agreed to offer
up to the state our known individual potential to use violence.  Ideally, in
other words, the state uses violence legitimately on our behalf.
The remarkable ways in which modern Western societies have gone
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about administrating the human energy of their citizens consistently points
to the rationalization theories of logical efficiency.  What seems to have
informed these theories in targeting the embodied energy of individuals
has been a consistently propagated knowledge about the self.  Thus, by first
objectifying individual subjectivity as autonomous, speaking directly to
this autonomy, indulging it with independent desires, claiming dominant
juridical bonds to it, and having consequently constructed its separate cells
of identity, the modern state then tactically offers itself as the confident
protector deserving of recipient loyalty from its autonomous subjects.  This
confidence belies, nonetheless, an anxiety, for while it rests upon claims
about knowing the subject, such knowledge can only come about upon
first accepting an epistemological lack and obstacle to knowing the subject
(Deleuze and Guattari 1977, 1987; Foucault 1978).  
Putting the human rights of individuals in the law, encouraging
debate about such rights, and situating the principle of rights in constantly
deliberated concepts about human life have all intentionally contributed to
a usurping.  I am referring to the usurping of dominant legitimate authority
over the individual by such traditional categories as the family, households,
neighborhoods, villages, clans, and so-called tribes.   In modern polities
it is the nation that has become the ideal community through which the
widest and strongest sentiments of devotion should presumably circulate.  
In other words, the national community claims to be the cultural form of
dominant relations in which the state and its citizens should seek and act
out their primary loyalties to each other (Anderson 1995).  
The obedience to the state and its power to demand such obedience
through sentiments of loyalty and devotion in the nation depends upon
first isolating each citizen within their own cellular identity.  In our modern
world, these identities regularly appear to be race, class, gender, and age.  
They have become the avenues toward a modern type of individualism
we should all be investing in, crafting, monitoring, and policing, not only
for our own sense of self, but also for the kind of knowledge the state
has of itself through its member citizens.   Bodies marked by their race,
class, gender, and age assist (at least temporarily) in abating any anxiety
the state may have about the kind of knowledge it possesses on what is
inside each motivated individual with the potential for using violence.  
Knowledge about the potential use of violence from racial bodies, as
well as those marked by class, gender, and age, should better inform axial
power in its task of administrating and ordering society more effectively.  
In addition, by each citizen investing internally in their own individual
identity and creating an overriding reality for individual difference, they
provide centralized state power with the justification for its own existence.  
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Whenever disputes arise between the differences, the state can step in and
claim (usually through the law) to be the only impartial or legal source of
arbitration.
We in the modern nation-state live everyday with contradictions
embedded in the constant proclamations about the availability of pleasure
and liberty.  They are splattered on the walls of our cell.  For example, very
few children traveling to school from their homes in buses with installed
surveillance cameras can miss seeing the stain of the lie to liberty.  The
posters in classrooms glare down their antinomies to pleasure, for they
warn each pupil against stimulating their body with drugs, alcohol, and
sex.  For every college student who has to leave the comfort of family and
home for the four-year liminal life, the impact of being disciplined by
the academy strangely echoes what they experienced in their natal nest.  
Even graduating into the new, seemingly liberated status of “licensed
driver” requires following the strict codes of conduct on the roads: stop
at red lights, go at green lights, and stay on the right side of median lines.  
Vehicles made to travel at speeds of 140 miles an hour can nowhere on
public highways be driven at such speeds without breaking the law.  In all
directions of modern life in the United States, the techniques of command
and obedience continue doggedly to bring forth the experience as well as
making true the axial power of the state and the disciplined autonomy of
the self.  
Now what might all this mean for an understanding of the Jonestown
deaths and all the other similar celebrated mass killings by United States
citizens during the late twentieth century?  I would argue the answer initially
revolves around attempts to re-appropriate violence as an expression of
individual empowerment and the eradication of solitude.   In popular
culture, we regularly suspend our sense of reality when bombarded by the
raw images of violence on the screen.  The viciousness of violence and its
powers to hurt and kill all become safe on the silver screen.  Yet, for those
of us who never experience the visceral reality of taking life or giving death
(and, indeed, appreciate that we do not even have to slaughter a chicken for
our food), we must never ever lose the knowledge and truth that physical
violence can hurt and kill.  While the ordinary citizen must give up the
right to use violence and the state (if it aspires to being modern in a Western
style) must use this right on behalf of its citizens, both, nonetheless, must
also retain confidence in the power of violence to produce its devastating
effects.  In such a world, power and violence have to be intertwined as one
and must so remain.  Thus, in this logic, the reappropriation of violence by
the Templars should be viewed as a reappropriation of power.
Having accepted the autonomy but not the isolation of cellular being,
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modern individualism appears to reach out for something more humanly
intimate than the protective juridical force of the state.  It seeks out a lateral
community that is closer, as well as more intuitive, than the imagined
fraternity of the nation and the filial bond of the state.   When these
cannot be found, or when found, either cannot fulfill the requirement of
eradicating the deep solitude of cellular being or cannot defend it against
attack, drastic measures often materialize.   In this regard, its particular
identification with power and its procedures for using this power to assert
the distinctive character of an autonomous cellular individualism in defense
against attack, made the Jonestown violence very much in line with United
States culture and society.
In their style of reappropriation, where the very ritual of suicide had
been practiced many times before the actual event, the Templars had been
repeatedly shown a kind of self-empowerment.  Yes, ironically so, because
at one level their actions of self-immolation may be seen as the result of
extremely obedient followers, ones without any means available to them
for achieving liberty through a will to power.  Yet if we were to see their
beliefs and actions in the same light that we often direct upon devoted
and patriotic nationals who readily and willingly volunteer to die as well as
fight for their nation in the military, the irony may not appear so strange.  
The Templars discovered in their church and pastor an immediacy
of human comfort as well as devotion to a cause securing them an
instant fertile achievement of selfhood.  Keep in mind at Jonestown that
70–80 percent of the Templars categorized themselves as urban African
Americans.   Consider also that of all the residents at Jonestown, twothirds were women: 49 percent black women and 14 percent white women.  
Of the 49 percent black women, 14 percent were 66 years of age or older.  
Only 10 percent of all the residents were white men.  The 70 infants of
five years and younger averaged 8 percent and the 417 children and youths
between the ages of six and nineteen averaged 46 percent of the total
population (Maaga 1998:9).   Within the rigor of discipline techniques
already available to them as part of their cultural knowledge, these men,
women, and children imagined and lived a paradise on earth within the
commune.
Achieved through both the lateral and axial forms of commune
relations, it was nevertheless the cellular aesthetic of the latter, with its
strict hierarchical framework, which stamped the most discerning features
of their community.  Armed guards at the rituals of worship, watchtowers
around the compound, regimented routines of work, education, sleep, and
beatings, as well as complete and utter devotion to their pastor, all provided
for the proper functioning and dominance of axial power.   In the end,
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the issue for the Templars was not self-destruction.  In the words of their
pastor and “father” Jim Jones, “We didn’t commit suicide, we committed
an act of revolutionary suicide” (Maaga 1978:164).  They gave their lives as
a gift of death to protect their church and what it meant to them.  At the
time, both were under siege by the agents of the state and United States
public opinion.  They sacrificed their own lives and those of their children
as a gift to Jones and to God.  In so doing, they reclaimed not only their
will to power but also the effect of violence in such power.
CONCLUSION
The simple assumption put forward in this paper has been, for the
Waiwai, that the privileging of lateral visibility brings ideas about a fractal
individual into association with recursive power, while for U.S. and coastal
Guyanese societies, respectively, the privileging of axial visibility brings
concepts about an autonomous individual into association with cellular
and contrapuntal relations of power.  It has been argued that, in its agenda
to achieve a greater efficiency for the workings of its political relations with
its citizens, the desire of the modern state, expressed through its privileged
use of axial visibility, de-emphasizes lateral relations and brings about
categorically isolated and solitary forms of individuals.
For the coastal Guyanese, having to live constantly within an ethic
of modernity, the scenario has been one of a refusal to succumb to such
notions of identity.  The apparent result for them has been a collective
sense of a lack of fulfillment with regards to achieving modernity, or. in
other words, a continuing experience of feeling “Third World.”  Primarily
because lateral visibility still remains a strong source for the expressive use
of contrapuntal authority, the debilitating effects of being Third World
have not, however, produced a demoralized society.  For the Templars, who
found themselves in Guyana with the cultural values of the United States
of America, their attempts at eradicating the civic experience of modern
solitude brought them to the “cult,” the comfort of its congregation, and
ultimately the serene bliss of death in the afterlife.
Let me conclude on this rather hesitant but suggestive note taken from
the Waiwai material and placed within the broader context of Amerindian
modes of knowledge.  One of the hidden hunches I hold—often subliminally
guiding my research—has been the suspicion that Amerindian modes of
knowledge possess the ability to keep a tight grip upon multiple concepts
at the very moment they are brought into use.  In contrast, lineal Western
styles of knowledge, subject to their particular history of metaphysics, force
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us to release at the instance we most need to use them the structures by
which concepts are brought forth.  It then becomes a somewhat contorted
task for the anthropologist to represent Amerindian knowledge when the
means of representation cannot close the gap between the sign and the
signifier, except of course by the antinomy of the suspension of knowledge
itself.  Amerindian modes of knowing, I believe, do not have the desire
to close on the foundations of truth, for truth already is: truth is already
experienced and not, as it so often is with us, desired, standing forth in front
of us yet to be possessed.  Perhaps then the product of the teachings I have
been attempting to present here has been taking place with the teacher
behind me and, behind her, the teachings of an Amerindian experience.
NOTES
Acknowledgments.  I wrote the foundation of the ideas in this paper for the conference
“In the World and About the World: Amerindian Modes of Knowledge” organized
by myself and Fernando Santos-Granero, held at the University of Virginia in
Charlottesville, Virginia on November 28 and 29,   2005.   I am grateful to all
of the participants in that conference for their helpful comments and generous
support.  I am particularly grateful, however, to Laura Mentore, the Waiwai, and
the Wapishana people of Erepoimo village for their substantive contribution to
my ideas.  I dedicate this paper to Čana and Kamina.
1.  I take my lead here not only from Michel Foucault (1978:200), but also
from the many anthropologists before him who have written on the subject of
social space.  
2.  It is, I believe, a question of a certain kind of consciousness, what Edouard
Glissant (1989:195–220) refers to as the promise of a reflective “national theater”
living in Antillean folkloric beliefs, unaware of its power for positive change.  
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